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Although a great deal of literature has been dedicated to the mutual links between
emotion and the selective attention component of executive control, there is very little data
regarding the links between emotion and the inhibitory component of executive control.
In the current study we employed an emotional stop-signal task in order to examine
whether emotion modulates and is modulated by inhibitory control. Results replicated
previous findings showing reduced inhibitory control [longer stop-signal reaction time
(SSRT)] following negative, compared to neutral pictures. Most importantly, results show
decreased emotional interference following stop-signal trials. These results show that the
inhibitory control component of executive control can serve to decrease emotional effects.
We suggest that inhibitory control and emotion have a two-way connection in which
emotion disrupts inhibitory control and activation of inhibitory control disrupts emotion.
Keywords: emotional processing, executive functions, inhibitory control, stop signal, SSRT, emotional interference
INTRODUCTION
Emotional stimuli play a major role in human lives. They are
considered to receive prioritized processing and therefore affect
behavior, cognition, and physiology. Maladaptive emotional pro-
cessing and deficient emotion regulation are core factors in dif-
ferent psychopathologies and therefore it is highly important to
understand their nature. One of the most studied topics among
emotion scientists is the relationship between emotion and atten-
tion (e.g., Vuilleumier, 2005; Pessoa, 2009). Emotional stimuli are
considered to capture attention and hence disrupt performance
(i.e., elongate RT) in various tasks, such as simple discrimination
tasks (Hartikainen et al., 2000; Buodo et al., 2002). This effect is
termed emotional interference [i.e., elongated reaction time (RT)
for negative compared to neutral trials]. Recently, a vast amount
of cognitive and affective studies has been dedicated to exploring
the influence of emotional information on tasks that require exec-
utive control. Executive control is considered to be a “high” order
system that incorporates several attentional subsystems (Posner
and Petersen, 1990; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008; Banich, 2009),
which act together in order to guide behavior in accordance with
internal goals (Shallice and Norman, 1986; Miyake et al., 2000;
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Banich, 2009). Importantly, both emo-
tion and executive control are crucial elements in goal-directed
behavior. Therefore, studying the links between these two sys-
tems is important for understanding adaptive and maladaptive
behavior. The aim of the current study is to investigate the con-
nection between inhibitory control—a component of executive
control—and emotion eliciting stimuli1 (i.e., negative pictures).
1In the context of this manuscript, we discuss the effects of briefly presented
emotional stimuli (e.g., negative pictures). It is important to note that these
stimuli cause temporary emotional arousal and do not create a long-lasting
emotional state or mood.
The influence of emotional stimuli on executive control was
studied mainly using selective attention tasks such as the Stroop
(1935) and the flanker (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) tasks. These
tasks measure the ability to attend to a relevant dimension and
ignore irrelevant, distracting information. The findings obtained
from studies that used such tasks are inconsistent. For instance,
using a modified version of the flanker task, Dennis et al. (2008)
found reduced executive control following presentation of fear-
ful faces. Similarly, Padmala et al. (2011) found that negative
stimuli reduced conflict monitoring and concluded that there
are shared resources between executive control and emotional
processing. Other studies found the opposite effect; namely, com-
pared to neutral information, emotional information improved
executive control in selective attention tasks (e.g., Kanske and
Kotz, 2010, 2011a,b; for further discussion see Cohen and Henik,
2012; Kanske, 2012).
Although the effects of emotion on executive control have
been widely studied, only recently have researchers begun to
explore the effects of executive control on emotion. Okon-Singer
et al. (2012) suggested that attentional factors, such as executive
control, can exert top-down modulation on emotion (see also
Bishop, 2008, for the neural mechanism responsible for regulat-
ing attention to threat-related cues; Ochsner and Gross, 2005, for
a review). This top-down modulation is crucial in situations in
which the emotional information is irrelevant and can disrupt
goal-directed behavior. In line with this suggestion, neuroimag-
ing studies found that activation of brain regions involved in
executive control (prefrontal, especially dorsolateral, and pari-
etal cortex) attenuates the activation in brain regions involved in
emotional processing (mainly the amygdala) (Hariri et al., 2000;
Liberzon et al., 2000; Pessoa, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005; Etkin et al.,
2006; Blair et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2008; Hart et al., 2010).
There is also behavioral evidence for the top–down regulation of
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emotional stimuli. Etkin et al. (2006, 2010) used an emotional
Stroop-like task and found a conflict adaptation effect (i.e., emo-
tional conflict in the current trail was attenuated following a
conflict in the previous trail). The authors concluded that exec-
utive processes (i.e., selective attention) can attenuate emotional
response. Recently, we found more direct behavioral evidence for
the top–down regulation of emotional stimuli (Cohen et al., 2011,
2012). We presented negative and neutral pictures following a
flanker target and measured emotional interference in a follow-
ing discrimination task. Participants were required to respond to
the direction of a middle arrow and ignore flanking arrows. The
flanking arrows could be congruent (<<<<<) or incongruent
(<<><<) with the target arrow. Incongruent trials consist of a
conflict and are considered to recruit executive control processes
(as indicated in elongated RT in incongruent vs. congruent trials).
Emotional interference was present after congruent trials, but was
eliminated after incongruent trials (Cohen et al., 2012; see also
Blair et al., 2007).
Looking at selective attention tasks to examine the connec-
tion between emotion and executive control might be insufficient.
In line with this notion, many researchers suggested that execu-
tive control is not unitary and urged discerning between different
components of control (Rafal and Henik, 1994; Harnishfeger,
1995; Miyake et al., 2000; Nigg, 2000; Banich, 2009). Selective
attention tasks, such as the Stroop (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod,
1991) and the flanker (Posner and Petersen, 1990) tasks measure
the ability to attend to a relevant dimension and ignore irrel-
evant, distracting information. The ability to ignore irrelevant
information might involve inhibition (Verbruggen et al., 2004;
Kalanthroff et al., 2012)—a core component of executive control
(van Veen and Carter, 2006; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). In the
current paper we ask whether the inhibitory component of exec-
utive control is influenced and can modulate emotional reaction
in a similar way as is found in selective attention.
INHIBITORY CONTROL
An important ingredient of executive control, and perhaps a hall-
mark of it, is the suppression of irrelevant information, thought,
or action (van Veen and Carter, 2006; Verbruggen and Logan,
2008). This component of executive control is termed inhibitory
control and is commonly associated with activation in the right
inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG; Aron et al., 2003). To study this pro-
cess in the laboratory, consider the stop-signal task (Logan and
Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994), which examines the ability to sup-
press an already initiated action that is no longer appropriate. In
the classic task, participants are asked to address a visual stim-
ulus (go signal) with a motor response as fast as possible. In
about one fourth of the trials, an auditory stimulus (stop sig-
nal), which signals to participants to inhibit their motor response,
comes right after the visual go signal. The duration between the
go signal and the stop signal (stop-signal delay; SSD) is submit-
ted to a tracking procedure and changes from one trial to the next
based on the participant’s success in inhibiting his or her response
(i.e., a successful inhibition will cause the next trial to be more
difficult—the SSD will be longer—and vice versa). Eventually, it
is possible to estimate the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT), which
is the time needed for successful inhibition. SSRT has proven to
be an important measure of cognitive control (Verbruggen and
Logan, 2008). Logan and Cowan (1984) and Logan et al. (1984)
compared the performance in the stop-signal task to a horse race
between the more automatic go process, triggered by the presen-
tation of the go signal, and the executive stop process, triggered
by the stop signal. Logan et al. (1984) argued that “response
inhibition phenomena are consistent with a hierarchical theory
of attention in which a high level process determines the sig-
nificance of incoming stimuli and decides whether to abort the
current stream of thought and action or to queue the new stim-
uli along with the old ones, to be processed as resources become
available” (p. 290).
INHIBITORY CONTROL AND EMOTION
Few studies concentrated on the relationship between emotion
and inhibitory control. Using a modified version of the stop-
signal paradigm, Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007) found that
emotional stimuli (negative or positive pictures) decrease the effi-
ciency of inhibitory control (i.e., longer SSRT in emotional trials).
Sagaspe et al. (2011) found prolonged RT in the presence of inci-
dental threatening information, though SSRT was unaffected by
emotion. However, these researchers did find that neural circuits
engaged by inhibition are modulated by threatening informa-
tion. Specifically, they found that stopping in a threatening trial
was associated with activations in the orbitofrontal cortex (and
not the inferior frontal gyrus usually associated with stopping).
This finding implies that inhibitory control in the presence of
emotional information may be different from inhibitory control
in neutral situations. Pessoa et al. (2012) used the stop-signal
task with high- and low-threat stimuli and found that the effi-
ciency of inhibitory control is increased by low-threat stimuli
and decreased by high-threat stimuli. This finding is in line with
Pessoa et al. (2012) notion that low threat improves executive
control since it increases goal-directed behavior (see also Kanske,
2012), whereas high threat attracts resources available for the task
and hence disrupts executive processes.
In contrast to the mixed findings regarding the influence of
emotion on selective attention, with respect to inhibitory control
most findings are consistent regarding the disruptive influence
of emotion on inhibitory control. A previous study showed that
an emotional stimulus deteriorates performance of both go and
stop processes (Verbruggen and De Houwer, 2007). However, it
is not yet clear whether inhibitory control exerts a regulatory
effect on emotion, similar to the effect of selective attention.
This question is highly important for few reasons: (a) under-
standing the connection between inhibition and emotion influ-
ence on performance can deepen our knowledge regarding the
connection between “high” (e.g., executive control) and “low”
(e.g., emotion) cognitive systems. (b) Deficient inhibitory control
underlies different psychopathologies and mood disorders, such
as autism (e.g., Geurts et al., 2004), schizophrenia (e.g., Enticott
et al., 2008), obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Chamberlain
et al., 2006), and anxiety (e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009), though
it is still unknown whether disrupted inhibitory control is
responsible for the abnormal emotional processing found in
these disorders. Depressed patients, for example, are known to
have deficient ability to inhibit processing of emotional stimuli
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(e.g., Goeleven et al., 2006) and thus, in this disorder the role
of disrupted inhibition is clearer. (c) Considering the fact that
inhibition is at least partially involved in most executive control
tasks (including selective attention tasks), the connection between
inhibition and emotion could potently contribute to the over-
all understating of the connection between executive control and
emotion.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The current study employed an emotional stop-signal task in
order to examine the reciprocal links between emotion and
inhibitory control. First, in no-stop-signal trials we predicted an
emotional interference effect, similar to results obtained in sim-
ple discrimination tasks (Hartikainen et al., 2000; Buodo et al.,
2002). Second, because we were using a design similar to the
one used by Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007), we predicted
a replication of their findings showing disrupted inhibitory con-
trol (i.e., longer SSRT) following negative compared to neutral
pictures. Most importantly, we expected that the emotional inter-
ference would be eliminated when the previous trial was a stop
trial. Namely, activation of inhibitory control processes during
stop trials would reduce activation of negative stimuli on a fol-
lowing no-stop trial. This prediction was based on previous
findings showing reduced emotional interference following exec-
utive activation using selective attention tasks (Cohen et al., 2011,
2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-seven students of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
(Israel) participated for a small monetary payment. The study
was approved by the ethical committee of the department of
Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. All par-
ticipants signed an informed consent form previous to their
participation in the experiment. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, had no history
of attention deficit, or learning disabilities, and all were naive as
to the purpose of the experiment. One participant was excluded
from further analysis due to a high error rate on no-stop-signal
trials [more than 3 standard deviations (SD) from the mean] and
one was excluded due to report of severe depressive symptoms
in a major depression inventory administered at the end of the
behavioral task (MDI; Bech, 1997; Bech and Wermuth, 1998).
In addition, because SSRT is an estimation of the time needed
for a participant to stop on 50% of the trials, if a participant’s
success in inhibiting responses to stop trials was significantly dif-
ferent from 50%, the SSRT would not be valid and the participant
would be excluded from further analysis [estimation method by
Verbruggen and Logan (2009); see also Verbruggen et al. (2008)].
Three participants (females) were excluded due to the latter cri-
terion. From the remaining 22 participants (10 females and 12
males) the youngest was 23 years old and the oldest was 29 years
old (mean = 25.1 years, SD = 1.66).
EQUIPMENT
Data collection and stimuli presentation were controlled by a
DELL OptiPlex 760 vPro computer with an Intel core 2 duo
processor E8400 3GHz. Stimuli were presented on a DELL
E198PF 19′′ LCD monitor. A keyboard was placed on a table
between the participant and the monitor. Participants were tested
individually. They sat approximately 23.5 in. from the computer
screen. Stickers with “@” and “#” signs were taped on two regular
keyboard keys that served as response keys.
PROCEDURE
The experiment included 12 practice trials, which were not fur-
ther analyzed, and 480 experimental trials. Participants were told
that the practice block would be identical to the experimental
block, only that the experimental block would be longer and
would not include feedback. Each trial started with a 1000ms fix-
ation (a black plus sign at the center of a gray screen). Fixation
was followed by a picture for 100ms. After the disappearance of
the picture, a visual go stimulus appeared (i.e., @ or #). Response
keys were “p” for the appearance of a “@” and “q” for a “#.”
Participants were asked to respond with the index fingers of both
hands. The instruction indicated to participants to press the cor-
rect key as fast and accurately as possible, and emphasized not
to wait for a potential stop signal. The go stimulus stayed in
view for 1500ms or until a key press. RT was calculated from
the appearance of the go stimulus to the response. On a ran-
dom selection of 30% of the trials, an auditory stop signal was
sounded (see Figure 1). The stop signal was presented after a vari-
able SSD that was initially set at 250ms and adjusted by a staircase
tracking procedure: after each successful stopping the SSD was
extended by 20ms and after each unsuccessful stopping the SSD
was shortened by 20ms. In half of the trials a neutral picture was
presented and in the other half a negative picture was presented.
SSD was adjusted for each valence condition (i.e., negative and
neutral) separately. Trial order was randomwith two restrictions:
we had the same number of neutral and negative stop-signal tri-
als (72 of each), and we had the same number of neutral and
negative trials that followed stop-signal trials (36 of each valence
condition in the current trial for each valance condition in the
previous trial).
FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure. Example of a negative stop-signal
trial.
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STIMULI
Participants were presented with an emotional stop-signal task.
We used 40 negative (mean valence = 2.41, mean arousal = 6.16)
and 40 neutral (mean valence = 5.01, mean arousal = 2.84) pic-
tures taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS;
Lang et al., 2001). The pictures were identical to those used by
Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007). Ten neutral pictures, differ-
ent from those used in the actual experiment, were used in the
practice phase. The go signals were black “@” or “#” signs pre-
sented at the center of a screen on a gray background and were
0.98 in. high and 2.36 in. wide. The stop signal was an auditory
tone (750Hz, 75ms) delivered by headphones.
RESULTS
In order to investigate our a-priori assumption that following
stop-signal trials negative stimuli would not affect RT, a Two-
Way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures was
applied to RT data of no-stop trials with valence (negative vs. neu-
tral) and previous trial (no-stop vs. stop) as within-subject factors
(see Table 1). A significant interaction between valence and previ-
ous trial was found, F(1, 21) = 6.325, p < 0.02, partial eta squared
(PES) = 0.231. As can be seen in Figure 2, following no-stop
trials, RT for negative stimuli was significantly longer than RT
for neutral stimuli, F(1, 21) = 18.905, p < 0.001, PES = 0.474. In
contrast, following stop trials, RT for negative stimuli did not dif-
fer significantly from RT for neutral trials, F < 1. Namely, the
emotional interference effect was eliminated following stop-signal
trials. This is similar to our previous findings showing atten-
uation of emotional interference following flanker incongruent
trials (Cohen et al., 2011).
In trials without a stop signal, mean RT of correct responses
was calculated for each participant in each valence condition.
A One-Way ANOVA with repeated measures was applied to RT
data with valence (negative vs. neutral) as a within-subject factor
(see Table 1). As expected, RT for negative stimuli was signifi-
cantly longer than RT for neutral stimuli, F(1, 21) = 22.191, p <
0.001, PES = 0.514. This finding replicates the known emotional
interference effect, which was previously found by using simple
discrimination tasks (Hartikainen et al., 2000; Buodo et al., 2002).
As mentioned before, SSD was adjusted for each valence
condition separately. Based on the assumption that chances for
successful inhibition were not significantly different than 0.50,
SSRT was calculated as mean RT minus median SSD for each
participant in each condition (see Verbruggen and Logan, 2009;
FIGURE 2 | Mean RT in the valence conditions following stop-signal
trials or no stop-signal trials. Error bars represent one standard error from
the mean based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subjects designs.
see Table 1). As predicted, SSRT for negative trials was longer
than SSRT for neutral trials. This was significant, F(1, 21) =
4.301, p = 0.05, PES = 0.17. This result replicates Verbruggen
and De Houwer’s (2007) findings and strengthens the claim
that emotional information disrupts inhibition-related executive
functions.
DISCUSSION
The results of the current study are straightforward: first, emo-
tional stimuli were found to impair responding and inhibitory
control (i.e., elongated SSRT). Second, activation of inhibitory
control was found to attenuate the (following) emotional effect.
In no stop-signal trials, responses to the discrimination task
were slower when preceded by negative stimuli than when pre-
ceded by neutral stimuli; namely, we found an emotional inter-
ference effect (Hartikainen et al., 2000; Schimmack, 2005). This
basically replicated previous findings that showed that negative
stimuli disrupt performance in simple discrimination tasks that
do not involve conflict (Hartikainen et al., 2000; Buodo et al.,
2002). This finding corresponds with LeDoux’s (1995) notion
that emotional stimulus saliency is increased in order to enhance
its processing.
Similar to Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007), we found
that stopping latencies were prolonged following presentation
of negative stimuli compared to stopping latencies following
Table 1 | Reaction time (RT in ms), standard deviation (SD), and accuracy (ACC) of the different trials in the two valance conditions
(Neutral and Negative).
Neutral Negative
RT SD ACC RT SD ACC
No stop signal 517 69 0.97 533 67 0.97
Following no stop signal 505 75 0.96 527 71 0.97
Following stop signal 539 63 0.97 541 66 0.97
SSRT SD p(response|signal) SSRT SD p(response|signal)
Stop signal 187 59 0.49 210 62 0.46
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 78 | 4
Kalanthroff et al. Inhibition of emotion following stop signal
neutral stimuli. Namely, the ability to stop decreased when an
irrelevant negative stimulus was presented. Similar to the results
found in the no-stop trials, the findings showing elongated stop-
ping latency following negative compared to neutral stimuli also
strengthen the notion that emotional stimuli capture attention
and receive prioritized processing compared to non-emotional
stimuli. The idea that the presentation of a negative stimulus
causes a momentary freeze (as would be expected from the fight,
flight, freeze theory) can be interpreted in two ways by our
findings. On the one hand, Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007)
suggested that a momentary freeze should have helped stopping
and thus SSRT should be shortened (improved) following a neg-
ative stimulus. On the other hand, a momentary cognitive freeze
that occurs during the presentation of a negative stimulus would
slow down the inhibitory control process. Our results, similar to
those of Verbruggen and De Houwer, show slowdown both in
the inhibitory control process and in RT to no-stop trials fol-
lowing a negative stimulus and thus indicate that cognitive freeze
did occur. These results are in line with those of other stud-
ies that found reduced performance in executive tasks following
emotional stimuli (e.g., Dennis et al., 2008; Padmala et al., 2011).
Importantly, in the current paper we examined the connection
between briefly (100ms) presented emotional stimuli (i.e., IAPS
negative pictures) and inhibitory control. The findings reflect
effects of a transient emotional arousal (as usually found when
emotional and non-emotional pictures are presented randomly
within the same block; Bradley et al., 1993) and not of a sustained
emotional state or mood (as found when presenting a block of
emotional pictures; Bradley et al., 1996). Briefly presented IAPS
pictures are known to elicit emotional arousal as measured using
physiological (Lang et al., 1993), electrophysiological (Schupp
et al., 2004), and brain imaging (Glascher and Adolphs, 2003)
methods (see Shackman et al., 2006 for a debate regarding assess-
ment of emotional effects). In line with these findings, in the
current study the IAPS pictures caused a momentary emotional
arousal which affected performance of both go and stop processes.
The most important contribution of the current study is the
finding regarding the effect of inhibitory control on emotion.
The novelty of our study is that it examines whether inhibitory
control can attenuate the effect of a following emotional stimu-
lus. Our results show that while RT increased following negative
stimuli, this effect disappeared in trials that where preceded by
a stop-signal trial; namely, the emotional interference effect was
not obtained following stop-signal trials. Accordingly, we suggest
that the need to inhibit a pre-potent response activated inhibitory
networks, which in turn down-regulated the emotional system
and eliminated its influence on behavior. Given that the current
research does not allow for direct measures of emotional pro-
cesses, we cannot be sure whether inhibitory processes directly
inhibits emotional processes or whether it inhibits the conse-
quences of emotional processes. Further research is needed in
order to investigate these interesting possibilities.
The current study’s findings correspond with our previous
findings that yielded a significant emotional interference effect
after flanker-congruent trials but not after flanker-incongruent
trials (Cohen et al., 2011). In that study it was argued that execu-
tive control activates top-down processes that can eliminate the
influence of emotions on behavior. This regulatory connection
was suggested as an interpretation for the finding that emo-
tions did not affect executive control. To differentiate from that
previous study, in the current study we found a “two-way” con-
nection in which negative stimuli interrupted inhibitory control
and operation of inhibitory control attenuated the influence of
emotion on performance. As mentioned earlier, the flanker task
and the stop-signal task activate different aspects of executive
control (though there is some overlap between the mechanisms
underlying them). Whereas the flanker task is mainly used to
study selective attention or conflict control, the stop-signal task
examines inhibitory control. While selective attention is charac-
terize by the need to focus on the relevant stimulus or dimension
and ignore irrelevant distracters, inhibitory control is character-
ize by the need to stop the current course of action. On the
neurological level, selective attention tasks are associated mainly
with activations of the anterior cingulate cortex and the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Cohen et al., 1990; Botvinick et al.,
1999, 2001; Carter et al., 1999; Niendam et al., 2012), while
stopping is mainly associated with activation of the rIFG; ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex and the presupplementary motor area
(pre-SMA) (Aron et al., 2003, 2007; Rubia et al., 2003; Chambers
et al., 2007; Chevrier et al., 2007). It seems that the relationship
between selective attention and emotion is not identical to the
relationship between inhibitory control and emotion. Specifically,
it seems that emotional stimuli impair inhibitory control but have
inconsistent effects on selective attention. However, converging
evidence from both of these executive components strengthens
the notion that activation of executive control processes regulates
the impact of emotion on behavior and on cognitive processes. As
mentioned in the introduction, selective attention tasks activate
inhibitory processes. It is possible that activation of the inhibitory
control process underlies the top-down regulation effect found
when using both selective attention and stop-signal tasks.
Some implications can be drawn from the current study
results. Earlier, we mentioned that many psychopathologies and
mood disorder are characterized by poor inhibitory control (e.g.,
autism—Geurts et al., 2004; schizophrenia—Enticott et al., 2008;
obsessive-compulsive disorder—Chamberlain et al., 2006; and
anxiety—Derakshan et al., 2009), and poor ability to suppress
processing of emotional information (e.g., depression—Goeleven
et al., 2006). Further research is needed in order to investigate
the connection between the deficit in inhibitory control and
the deficit in emotion regulation in these patients. Attention
deficit\hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is another widespread
condition that the current study results may have implications
for. People with ADHD are known to have deficient inhibitory
control (stop-signal inhibition was proposed to be “an endophe-
notype of ADHD,” see Verbruggen and Logan, 2008, for review)
and they also experience difficulties in emotion regulation (e.g.,
Walcott and Landau, 2006). The current study results imply that
these two phenomena may be connected, though further research
is needed in order to fully understand the connection between
poor inhibitory control and the deficit in emotions regulation in
individuals with ADHD.
To conclude, in the current study we demonstrated that
emotional stimuli interfere with task performance, although,
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following trials that required inhibitory control this effect
disappears—RT of negative trials was similar to RT of
neutral trials. Additionally, we replicated previous findings
showing that emotional stimuli interfere with inhibitory con-
trol. These findings suggest a two-way connection between
inhibitory control and emotion in which emotion both dis-
rupts and is modulated by inhibitory control. It seems that
under some circumstances “high” cognitive systems can reg-
ulate or even suppress “low” systems such as the emotional
system and thus prevent it from influencing performance.
This mechanism has a potentially adaptive function—it enables
goal-directed behavior in the presence of briefly presented
irrelevant emotional information. Further research is still
needed in order to uncover the specific circumstances in
which this top-down regulation occurs and the implications of
deficits in this regulation mechanism for emotion dysregulation
disorders.
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